

Unclassified



A Proud Record

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research at Fifty (U)

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INR's ability to provide Department principals with the information and analysis they need for effective diplomacy derives from the expertise of our people, the independence and objectivity of our analysis, and the fact that we are close to the policy process. We provide the right product to the right people, when they need it.

Phyllis E. Oakley,
INR Assistant Secretary

Authors' Note: This brief history was prepared as part of the activities marking INR's 50th anniversary in 1997. It is intended to chronicle some of the highlights of INR's development but not to be a comprehensive survey of that development or of the world events surrounding it.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is a direct lineal descendant of General "Wild Bill" Donovan's Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which gained renown during World War II for its operations overseas. The OSS also had a large and effective Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch, which was transferred to the State Department when the OSS was disbanded in September 1945. Secretary of State Byrnes dismembered the branch, but it was reformed in early 1947--a few months before the creation of the CIA--by Secretary (and General) George Marshall.

INR's original 1,600 employees probably would not recognize it today. Equipped with much of the latest technology, it is smaller now than it has ever been, with about 275 employees.

But the most important evolution has been in INR's role in supporting US foreign policy decision makers. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Bureau was made up of analysts with an academic bent who not only put current developments into perspective but also were charged with compiling substantial basic intelligence studies for the Intelligence Community (IC) series known as the *National Intelligence Surveys* (NIS). The view then was that INR could make its greatest contribution to US foreign policy by doing basic research, as the OSS R&A Branch had done. INR also had limited access to the Secretary of State in its first few years. But, in 1950, daily morning briefings were instituted at Secretary Dean Acheson's request.

Roger Hilsman, Director of INR from 1961 to 1963, divested the Bureau of its NIS responsibilities and focused resources on more immediately policy-relevant tasks. Hilsman had good access to Secretary Rusk and to President Kennedy. In 1973, Director Ray Cline launched the daily *Secretary's Morning Summary* (SMS) to provide timely analyses keyed to the Secretary's agenda, marking definitively the transition to an emphasis on current intelligence. In the mid-1990s, INR began to organize support to diplomatic operations abroad, a program using state-of-the art communications technology to provide near-real-time intelligence and analysis to US officials engaged in border security, sanctions monitoring, and other support to diplomacy in hotspots around the world.

Today, INR's attention is focused on a much wider array of places and problems than it was during most of its history. Twenty-four-hour television news coverage is now both a resource and a competitor, and the Internet has drastically expanded both the range and the quantity of information on subjects as diverse as political movements in Bosnia, refugee flows in central Africa, and European concerns about financial problems in Asia. The only certainty for INR is that its contribution to national security will continue to evolve, and that it will remain a fascinating and rewarding place to work.

1940s: A Phoenix From the Ashes

With Executive Order 9621 of 20 September 1945, President Truman abolished the OSS and transferred its R&A Branch to the Department of State. The order established the Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS) as a holding place for these former OSS elements. By close of business 31 December 1945, IRIS was to have been abolished and Secretary of State Byrnes was to have established a new State-based intelligence entity, using whatever IRIS resources he chose.

Truman wrote to Byrnes:

I particularly desire that you take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies. . . through the creation of an interdepartmental group, heading up under [sic] the State Department which would formulate plans for my approval.

Truman, by asking State to develop a plan, was giving the Department an opportunity to make State the center of what was to become the IC. On 28 September, Alfred McCormack, a New York corporate lawyer and a colonel in the War Department's G-2, was appointed the first Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence. He took charge of IRIS's 1,600 officers, including a number from preexisting State Department research entities, and set to work planning IRIS's successor within the Department.

McCormack had to focus on meeting State's intelligence needs and to contend with strong opposition--from both inside and outside the Department--to State's prospective lead role in a national intelligence structure. The War and Navy Departments sought to persuade Truman that the State Department should not be the center of the new intelligence structure and, indeed, that the structure should be decentralized.

The military found an ally in Assistant Secretary for Administration Donald Russell, a former law partner of Secretary Byrnes. Russell shared both the concern of many Foreign Service Officers that State's traditional diplomatic function would be overwhelmed by the intelligence component, and the belief that this component was redundant to the work done by the desks.

Russell and the regional office directors (today's assistant secretaries)--particularly Spruille Braden, responsible for Latin America, and Loy Henderson, responsible for the Near East--believed IRIS should be dismantled and its divisions reassigned to the regional policy offices. As a handwritten Russell postscript on a memo to the Secretary put it: "Intelligence is only as good as it is translated into action. Where is that? The geographic desks."

McCormick supported only by then Under Secretary Acheson, opposed this plan on several grounds. In particular, he argued:

The centralization of intelligence research in offices which have no responsibility for operating decisions makes it possible to attain an independence which would not be possible if research were the responsibility of the operating offices. Research subordinated to offices whose primary responsibility is operating decisions would inevitably tend to reflect policy views.

The McCormick-Russell dispute, characterized by one regional office director as a "knock-down, drag-out fight," continued for months and even spilled into the press. There was a brief pause for the

formation of the Office of Research and Intelligence (ORI), essentially a renaming of IRIS, to meet the President's requirement that IRIS be abolished before the beginning of 1946, but the debate soon resumed.

While Byrnes equivocated, the fight grew nastier. One head of a geographic office was said to "[need] research people, but does not want any of McCormack's intelligence characters in his organization." Suspicions were even voiced that some of McCormack's key subordinates who had come over from the OSS were Communists. A Russell subordinate later claimed in testimony before a Senate committee that the merger of various wartime agencies into State was designed to get Communists into the Department, and the plan for a centralized intelligence office (which, he claimed, was drafted by Alger Hiss) was intended to put them in control.

State's intelligence management paralysis, brought on by the McCormack-Russell dispute, and key Department officials' distaste for intelligence allowed others to persuade President Truman to change his mind about putting State in charge of the national intelligence organization. In February 1946, the Central Intelligence Group--the CIA's immediate predecessor--was created.

On 22 April 1946, Secretary Byrnes adopted the Russell plan, giving ORI's analytic assets to the desks and leaving only an entity called the Advisory Committee on Intelligence (ACI), and the Office of Coordination and Liaison. McCormack resigned the next day. He was replaced briefly by Dr. William L. Langer, a Harvard historian who had been head of the OSS's R&A Branch. Langer served only until August 1946, when he was replaced by William A. Eddy, another OSS veteran.

State's dispersal of responsibility for intelligence analysis to the regional bureaus did not work well: the analysts never physically moved to their respective country desks. By January 1947, problems had emerged that made clear that the ACI was proving unequal to its responsibilities. For example, its authority on security issues was being challenged by the research (intelligence) division chiefs in the Latin America and Near East offices. Allegedly, these disputes were causing "certain intelligence centers" to withhold information from the State Department on the grounds that the Department manifestly could not maintain the level of security required for intelligence activities.

On 10 February 1947, the new Secretary of State, Gen. George Marshall, accepted the recommendation of Eddy and Acheson that he once again consolidate all the Department's intelligence functions in the Office of the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, later known simply as the "R Area." INR--albeit by a different name--was born.

Early Years

In terms of personnel, INR was at its zenith during the late 1940s and the 1950s. It had more staff than any time since--about 700 people. Moreover, INR participated directly in many interagency activities under National Security Council (NSC) auspices.

INR's analytic focus also was different from today. Some 40 percent of the Bureau's budget during this era came from CIA and supported analysts whose job was to write for the NIS. These were comprehensive studies whose goal was to include everything a warrior or a warrior-diplomat might need to know in order to fight against or alongside any country in the world. As analysts do today, the analysts writing for these surveys also examined current developments and wrote reports related to policy concerns. For example, the Far East section's Japan analysts addressed issues related to US occupation policies, while its China specialists monitored the struggle between the Communists forces and the US-backed Nationalists.

INR Leadership

Special Assistants for Research and Intelligence

Alfred McCormack, 1945-46
William L. Langer, 1946
William Alfred Eddy, 1946-47
W. Park Armstrong, 1947-57
Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., 1957

Directors of INR

Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., 1957-61
Roger Hilsman, 1961-63
Thomas L. Hughes, 1963-69
Ray S. Cline, 1969-73
William G. Hyland, 1974-75
Harold H. Saunders, 1975-78
William Bowdler, 1978-79
Ronald I. Spiers, 1980-81
Hugh Montgomery, 1981-85
Morton I. Abramowitz, 1985-86

Assistant Secretaries for INR

Morton I. Abramowitz, 1986-89
Douglas P. Mulholland, 1989-93
Toby T. Gati, 1993-97
Phyllis E. Oakley, 1997-present

In February 1949, the "Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government," chaired by former President Hoover, looked into problems that had become apparent in INR. The Hoover Commission, after noting that INR had rocky relations with the regional offices/bureaus, recommended that it cut back on the production of the academic studies that were the Office's primary products--foremost among them the NIS--and place greater emphasis on more immediately useful intelligence. The Korean war soon proved the validity of the Hoover Commission's recommendation to focus more on current intelligence.

Korea, Suez, and Hungary

Neither INR nor the IC predicted the outbreak of the Korean war on 24 June 1950 or China's entry into the war later that year, but resources were quickly marshaled in response to the crisis. By late afternoon on 25 June, INR's Estimates Group had prepared an *Intelligence Estimate* on the invasion which was passed immediately to Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary with responsibility for the Far East, and George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff and Counselor of the Department. The *Estimate* concluded that North Korea sought a military victory within seven days, and that, without US help, South Korean forces were doomed to defeat. The *Estimate* further concluded that "the move against South Korea must . . . be considered a Soviet move" and assessed the implications almost entirely in a Soviet context.

During the war, special Assistant W. Park Armstrong played a key behind-the-scenes role, both heading up INR's analytic effort and working on more general staff issues. He was a regular attendee at strategy meetings, typically briefing on the military situation, including sometimes on the activities of US forces. Armstrong played a similar role during the 1956 Suez crisis when he was dispatched to New York in

early November to meet UN Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold. Armstrong gave him an intelligence briefing pointing to the immediate need to deploy a UN force.

To cover the Korean war, INR's staff received a temporary boost--25 positions for the last three months of FY 1951--but this occurred in the context of a broad effort to downsize. Five months before the 1953 cease-fire, INR had shrunk 10 percent from its June 1950 size. A 1955 study by a Bureau employee notes a pattern familiar to today's analyst: the increasing workload was accommodated "by means of uncompensated overtime, procedural improvements, the emphasis on current intelligence and estimates at the expense of other forms, and the elimination of worthwhile but comparatively lower priority work."

The simultaneous Suez and Hungarian crises also presented INR with "severe challenges," as Armstrong described the problems caused by downsizing. He testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee that, whereas in calendar year 1954 the Bureau gave 1,765 briefings to "top officials of the Department" and in 1955 gave 2,072, in 1956 that number was 2,640. INR responded to an increased number of taskers from both regional and functional bureaus; prepared *Intelligence Estimates*, sometimes overnight; and maintained "an almost continuous alert."

Civil Service-Foreign Service Mix

The Bureau underwent various reorganizations during the 1950s, including the 1957 reorganization during which the name INR came into use. In terms of personnel, the most significant development was the 1954 integration of the majority of INR personnel into the Foreign Service. Though initially disruptive, the action helped erode the barriers between INR and the policy bureaus. Although most Civil Service employees opted to join the Foreign Service, a portion (mostly women) of the analysts remained in the Civil Service.

Over the years, the Civil Service component (today, about 72 percent) has provided continuity and historical perspective. Foreign Service Officers assigned to the Bureau have brought in-country experience and a policy-oriented perspective, while gaining a deeper understanding of their assigned region and honing their analytic skills.

A Turbulent Decade

When Dean Rusk became Secretary in 1961, he brought in Roger Hilsman, another OSS veteran who had also been a senior official in the Congressional Research Service, to head INR. Rusk met every morning with Hilsman and his successor, Thomas Hughes. President Kennedy also knew and liked Hilsman, who used this relationship on occasion to give INR analysts the opportunity to brief the President. For example, an INR Soviet analyst helped prepare Kennedy for his first television interview after the Cuban missile crisis.

Shortly after Hilsman assumed control of INR, Rusk gave him two tasks. The first was to examine the Bureau's organization and to optimize it to provide intelligence studies pertinent to the conduct of foreign policy and the representation of the Department within the IC. This task was similar to the Hoover Commission's recommendation in 1949. The second task was to review and improve the interdepartmental process for coordinating sensitive intelligence activities to ensure that they supported foreign policy goals.

Hilsman carried out the first task in large part by divesting the Bureau of one of its major missions, drafting the political and economic sections of the encyclopedic NIS. Hilsman's changes reduced INR's staff from about 700 to 350.

The second task was administratively harder to accomplish, but, after one attempt that was blocked by CIA, the Department centralized intelligence coordination activities in INR in 1961. This critical job included coordinating special intelligence activities, reconnaissance missions, and clandestine collection operations. During this period, President Kennedy, disillusioned with the CIA after the Bay of Pigs invasion, sent a letter to all US Ambassadors giving them the authority "to oversee and coordinate" all

US Government activities in their host countries. This was a significant departure from guidance in previous Presidential letters that had exempted intelligence activities.

Hilsman reports that he had become aware of the impending Bay of Pigs invasion by correlating various reports with remarks let slip by DCI Allen Dulles. Sensing that the plan was weak, Hilsman had sought Rusk's permission for INR to write an analysis of the operation. Rusk ordered him not to, saying that the whole issue was far too sensitive. After the debacle unfolded much as Hilsman had feared, Hilsman determined that he had an obligation to offer his Bureau's analysis wherever it might be helpful. Rather than ask permission in advance, he would deal with the consequences afterward.

This lesson may help explain why Hilsman was often willing to challenge Defense Secretary McNamara. Indeed, Rusk more than once brought Hilsman to White House meetings and then sat back while Hilsman and McNamara argued the issue at hand, sometimes in rather harsh terms. Thomas Hughes, Hilsman's deputy and successor at INR, probably also took this lesson to heart, as evidenced by INR's bold analytic stand during the Vietnam war.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Hilsman also played a key role in the Cuban missile crisis. In August and September 1962, concern was growing that the USSR was supplying a significant buildup of offensive forces in Cuba, though the IC played down the likelihood that the forces might include nuclear missiles. The Community, in a Special National Intelligence Estimate on *The Military Buildup in Cuba*, unanimously judged that, although the USSR "could derive considerable military advantage" from the establishment of nuclear missile sites in Cuba, it was unlikely to do so. INR and the Community were proved wrong, however, when the missiles were identified in U-2 imagery on 15 October.

The CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, Ray Cline, a future Director of INR, alerted Hilsman, and Hilsman in turn alerted Rusk. Hilsman went on to play a minor role in Kennedy's "ExCom" (executive committee) that handled the crisis. But his key contribution was as a link in the Washington-Moscow communications chain that ultimately led to resolution of the crisis. On 26 October, Soviet Embassy officer Aleksandr Fomin urgently summoned ABC reporter John Scali to a lunch so he could convey a message from Moscow outlining a possible deal under which the missiles would be removed in exchange for a US pledge never to invade Cuba. After the lunch, Scali went straight to Hilsman's office and typed a memorandum of conversation which Hilsman circulated in the government.

The Vietnam Test

Hughes became Director when Hilsman left to head the Far East Bureau. Early in Hughes's tenure, INR's analysis of the Vietnam war caused the Bureau to run afoul of Defense Secretary McNamara. On 22 October 1963, INR published a Research Memorandum entitled *Statistics on the War Effort in South Vietnam Show Unfavorable Trends*. This report concluded that despite the positive spin put on the Vietnam situation by the Defense Department and the US military command in Vietnam--on whose statistics the paper drew heavily--there was "an unfavorable shift in the military balance." The report, like other INR analytic papers at the time, was distributed to the White House, the CIA, and the Pentagon.

McNamara and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were furious. The JCS wrote a rebuttal that McNamara sent to Rusk under the following note:

Dean, attached is the State memo re the war in Vietnam. Below it are the comments of the Chiefs. If you were to tell me that it is not the policy of the State Department to issue military appraisals without seeking the views of the Defense Department, the matter will die. Bob.

McNamara also demanded that Hughes and INR's Vietnam analyst be reprimanded. Rusk summoned the two and explained the situation. Hughes argued that it was virtually impossible to separate military appraisals from political appraisals. Furthermore, he continued, when he took the helm at INR he was

promised that the Bureau could pursue its analyses independent of policy control. If INR's analyses were to be controlled by McNamara, then he, Hughes, would quit. Rusk brushed the issue aside, saying only, "Well, at least you know how strongly Bob feels."

Despite giving Hughes the impression that he would drop the issue, Rusk wrote back to McNamara:

It is not the policy of the State Department to issue military appraisals without seeking the views of the Defense Department. I have requested that any memoranda given interdepartmental circulation which include military appraisals be coordinated with your Department.

This prevented INR from circulating analysis of military developments outside the Department but did not curtail its critique of such matters for Department officials. In general, INR was skeptical about the efficacy of US actions and the capability of the South Vietnamese regime to defeat the more determined and better organized Communist forces supported by China and the Soviet Union. This view was most notable in a series of Community *National Intelligence Estimates* (NIEs) between October 1964 and December 1965. Throughout the war, INR produced hundreds of papers analyzing developments and issues affecting the course of the war, negotiations, and the post-1973 struggle, irrespective of their "fit" with the current US policy position, occasionally straining relations between the Bureau and policymakers.

1969-1979

Hughes left office in 1969, and he was succeeded by Ray Cline, another OSS veteran. Cline brought INR analysis squarely into the current intelligence arena by inaugurating the SMS, published daily since 9 March 1973. The SMS initially was produced jointly, and for the Secretary's eyes only, by the INR Watch and the State Department's Operations Center (S/S-O) and consisted almost entirely of summarized intelligence, press, and Embassy reporting. INR took over sole responsibility for the SMS in 1987, established a separate SMS staff, and expanded analytic coverage of current intelligence. Bureau analysts thereafter prepared short assessments for the SMS as well as the longer (one-page) analytic essays that had long been a feature of the publication.

The SMS is INR's flagship publication. Though it no longer is for the Secretary's eyes only and is circulated to many in the Department, principal officers overseas, the NSC, and senior officials in other US Government agencies, it continues to focus on the Secretary's priorities.

Some other areas of Cline's directorship of INR did not, however, mirror his success in establishing the SMS. Cline was frustrated during his tenure, believing the Bureau never had the staff or authority to do all its work. He also had little access to Secretary Rogers. The Director praised INR's "younger Foreign Service Officers with a flair for research," but he had a rocky relationship with the "haughty Foreign Service Officers in the regional bureaus," which he called little baronies. He wrote, for example, that:

The Director [of INR], although clothed in the rank and privileges of an Assistant Secretary of State, had to rely on his connections in CIA and the White House to get things done and make an impact in high-level intelligence matters, mainly because by and large the rest of State officialdom still did not really value an independent analytic approach that sometimes threatened already established policy positions.

Photo

Caption: Three current/former INR Assistant Secretaries and seven Deputy Assistant Secretaries honor Secretary's *Morning Summary* Editor Henry Myers (seated, second from left) at his retirement luncheon in 1995. Standing: Phyllis Oakley (current Assistant Secretary), Tom Fingar, Toby Gati, Jennifer Sims, Mark Lowenthal, and Dan Kurtzer. Seated: Jim Steinberg (current Deputy National Security Adviser), Henry Myers, Morton Abramowitz, and Jon Wiant. The three INR Assistant Secretaries are Oakley, Gati, and Abramowitz; Fingar, Sims, Lowenthal, Kurtzer, Steinberg, and Wiant are current or former Deputy Assistant Secretaries.

INR's general practice of hewing to its own analysis was sometimes honored in the breach, with

unhappy consequences. In May 1973, an interagency assessment of prospects for an Arab-Israeli war, concurred in by INR, found no reason to believe that "hostilities will...become inevitable or even probable." In a 31 May memorandum to Secretary Rogers, however, INR said it saw the threat of war with "a little more urgency" and concluded that, if the diplomatic situation in the Middle East continued relatively unchanged, "our view is that the resumption of hostilities by autumn will become better than an even bet." By autumn, however, INR pulled back from that analysis and rejoined the IC consensus that war was not imminent. Secretary Kissinger, in his memoirs, specifically refers to new INR and CIA analyses that by 30 September led him to believe that a war would not break out. The war started on 6 October.

Cline was succeeded by William Hyland, a member of Kissinger's inner circle and his key adviser at the NSC on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) issues. During Hyland's tenure (1973-75) and that of his successor, INR had extensive access to the Secretary. This heightened reliance on INR derived in part from Kissinger's preexisting relationship with Hyland but also reflected Kissinger's distrust of CIA analyses. Kissinger made clear that he expected State's policy bureaus to include INR in their deliberations, particularly on SALT issues, where they were expected to get a Hyland clearance on critical papers.

Hyland gave high priority to strengthening INR's capacity for analysis of politico-military questions, especially those involving strategic weapons. Taking positions from elsewhere in INR, he created the Office of Strategic Affairs, which took on issues such as SALT and later nuclear proliferation, and the Office of Political-Military Affairs and Theater Forces (PMT). This new office was quickly put to the test by the 1974 war in Cyprus, the first of many military actions it would cover. INR's Cyprus analyst briefed President Nixon.

PMT also played a significant role in conventional arms control issues such as the mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks in Europe and analysis of conventional arms transfers, the control of which was of great interest to the Carter administration.

Hyland's successor, Harold (Hal) Saunders (1975-78), also was in Kissinger's inner circle, having been his Middle East expert on the NSC staff. Saunders continued to function in that capacity while Director of INR. He weathered the transition from the Ford to the Carter administrations, staying on as Secretary Vance's INR Director.

In early 1977, Vance directed Anthony Lake, Director of Policy Planning (later President Clinton's National Security Adviser and a self-avowed fan of INR analysis), Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) Roy Atherton, and William Quandt of the NSC to undertake a thorough review of the Middle East situation. This review helped inspire the administration's efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East that culminated in the 1978 Camp David accords. The group that did this review was to remain essentially intact all the way through Camp David, even after Saunders became NEA Assistant Secretary in April 1978.

During this time, INR institutionalized the practice of regular CIA/State Department policy bureau/INR meetings to encourage more effective intelligence coordination in Washington. In addition, the State Department and CIA established regular meetings between the Secretary and the DCI in response to recommendations of the Church and Pike Congressional committees to foster improved dialogue between the two agencies. These meetings continue today.

In 1976, INR broke new ground in the application of previously classified imagery intelligence assets. Working with the US Agency for International Development, INR arranged for U-2 aerial surveys of Guatemala following the severe earthquake that killed more than 20,000 people and destroyed the country's infrastructure. An INR officer carried the film to the Government of Guatemala for use with the international relief effort.

1980s

Starting with the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan--of which INR warned Secretary Vance--and running through the tenures of Secretaries Haig and Shultz, INR was a key player in a broad governmental effort to use intelligence to advance the Western cause against the Soviet Union. One public example of this was the series of State Department *Special Reports* on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan written primarily by INR analysts. INR analysts also gave numerous background briefings to journalists on this and other subjects, such as chemical weapons use by the Soviets or their proxies. In September 1983, INR Director Hugh Montgomery--the last of five OSS veterans to head the Bureau--reportedly helped smooth the way for Secretary Shultz to use NSA signals intelligence in public condemnation of the Soviets for the shootdown of Korean Airlines flight 007.

Former Ambassador and career Foreign Service officer Morton Abramowitz headed the Bureau from 1985 to 1989, becoming its first Assistant Secretary in 1986. During his tenure, INR analysts had to develop new frameworks to assess the Gorbachev revolution, unprecedented changes in China, the ouster of Marcos in the Philippines, and the proliferation of missiles and other weapons of mass destruction. This was also the period of contentious analyses of and US interventions in Central America.

Secretary Shultz instituted regular Saturday morning sessions at which INR analysts provided briefings and participated in roundtable discussions of emerging issues. Abramowitz worked especially closely with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Michael Armacost, undertaking a number of sensitive diplomatic and factfinding missions.

During the 1980s, especially under Abramowitz, the intelligence policy and coordination side of INR continued to grow. The Reagan administration's vigorous use of covert action to accomplish foreign policy objectives meant that INR was busier than ever in oversight and coordination of these sensitive programs. INR also expanded its role in coordinating defense intelligence activities and sensitive law enforcement operations.

For a bureau whose publications have consistently focused on classified analysis, INR in the 1980s also marked perhaps the most high-profile use of one of its unclassified publications. Starting in 1982, the Department published a series of *Foreign Affairs Notes*, drafted by INR, highlighting Soviet disinformation. The 1987 issue, *Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986-87*, exposed various outlandish Soviet claims being picked up in newspapers around the world. Most notably, it debunked Soviet allegations that AIDS was the result of a Pentagon biological weapons program.

At first, the 1987 report attracted little attention, but a copy found its way to Mikhail Gorbachev's inbox. During an October meeting in Moscow, Gorbachev waved the copy in Secretary Shultz's face and assailed him over it. This led to "a rather acrimonious exchange," as Shultz told reporters. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet newspaper *Izvestiya* published an article reporting that the Soviet Academy of Sciences did not believe the AIDS virus was artificially created at a Pentagon weapons lab.

Abramowitz followed up on efforts initiated by Director Montgomery to upgrade the Bureau's information-handling systems. The first version of INRISS, the INR Information Support System, was inaugurated during Abramowitz's tenure, and INR took its first steps into the electronic age.

When James Baker became President Bush's Secretary of State, he tapped Douglas P. Mulholland, a career CIA economist who had headed Baker's intelligence unit at Treasury, to be INR's second Assistant Secretary. Mulholland continued the emphasis on providing timely, focused, and policy-related analysis begun by Hilsman and endorsed by each of his successors. INR retained its independent voice in addressing such post-Cold War issues as the collapse of the Soviet empire, revitalization of the Middle East peace process, Tiananmen and its aftermath in China, and the North Korean nuclear weapons program. As it was in the Abramowitz era, INR was often in the minority--many times a minority of one--when the IC tried to reach consensus on developments in a world where many old verities were suddenly inappropriate.

Photo

Caption: On 9 August 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher (second from left) and National Security Agency Director Vice Admiral J. Michael McConnell (far left) presided over a ribbon-cutting ceremony hosted by Toby Gati, INR Assistant Secretary (third from left), inaugurating the NSA Cryptologic Support Group located in INR's 24-hour Watch. At far right is Barbara McNamara, then-NSA Deputy Director of Operations, currently NSA's Deputy Director.

Mulholland guided the Bureau through its coverage of two crises of world significance: the Gulf war and the coup in Moscow. During the 1990-91 Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, INR's analysis that Iraqi military resistance would collapse once combat started turned out to be remarkably prescient. INR also proved its ability to sustain 24-hour-a-day analytic coverage for months on end.

The Gulf war was the first "CNN crisis," during which INR analysts were not only able to exploit the network as a valuable source but also were compelled to compete with it, ensuring that the written products delivered to policymakers provided real-time, intelligence-based analytic insights not available on their TV screens. During this period, INR provided many classified and unclassified imagery briefings to coalition partners, other governments, and, as appropriate, to the foreign press in support of diplomatic operations to counter false Iraqi propaganda and strengthen international resolve.

Photo

Caption: Six former chiefs on INR attended INR's 50th anniversary celebration at the Department of State on 8 December 1997. Five of the six joined current Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research Phyllis Oakley (third from left) for this photo: (left to right) Hal Saunders (1975-78), Tom Hughes (1963-69), Phyllis Oakley (1997-), Douglas Mulholland (1989-93), Toby Gati (1993-97), and Roger Hilsman (1961-63). (Not pictured is Bill Hyland, 1973-75).

Throughout the Desert Shield/Desert Storm period, the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly unstable. When the coup took place in August, INR again went to 24-hour analytic operations. The NSC tasked INR to coordinate consolidated IC situation reports for distribution throughout the government--an effort honored with an IC award from the DCI.

During Mulholland's tenure, INR also saw the need for a more centralized US approach to tracking suspected terrorists and preventing their entry into the United States. INR created a computerized, all-source database to provide timely support to consular and immigration officials. In its 10 years of existence, the program has detected 807 suspected terrorists applying for visas; 248 suspected hijackers, hostage holders, assassins, bombers, and other terrorist felons have been denied US visas.

1990s: A New World

Toby T. Gati was the first chief of INR (1993-97) whose entire term took place after the breakup of the Soviet Union. She had a keen interest in Russia and its evolution, the UN, and international peacekeeping, and promoted the use of INR and IC resources to address these issues. Her interest in multilateralism, which reflected that of the US Government generally, brought INR analysts into new analytic and operational arenas. Thus, for example, analysts participated in internationally sponsored election monitoring in such farflung places as Cambodia and Bosnia and served as political advisers to Operational Provide Comfort aiding Kurds in northern Iraq.

Gati launched *Peacekeeping Perspectives*, an in-depth biweekly on multilateral conflict management and humanitarian operations. The publication became popular throughout the government, drawing kudos from, among others, Madeleine Albright, then Ambassador to the UN. *Peacekeeping Perspectives* was destined to have a short lifespan, however, because attitudes to peacekeeping operations changed after their limits and complexity became evident on the streets of Mogadishu. The journal published its last substantive issue on 14 December 1995. Other Gati innovations--the distinctive green INR logo, standardization of publications formats, introduction of analyst *Viewpoints*, and the entry of most INR and analytic products onto Intelink, the IC's version of the Internet--continue.

INR took other bold steps into the information age during Gati's tenure. A nearly \$4 million upgrade of

INRISS gave Bureau analysts state-of-the-art information-processing capabilities and e-mail connectivity with other IC agencies. A National Security Agency Cryptologic Support Group was integrated into the INR Watch.

After the Dayton accords of November 1995 ended the military conflict in Bosnia, that country became the venue for the first field trial of a key Gati priority--Support to Diplomatic Operations, with the April 1996 establishment of the Diplomatic Intelligence Support Center (DISC) to provide analytic and collection support to senior US diplomats in Bosnia. In 1997, the DISC was awarded the prestigious Killian Award by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Another innovation for INR was establishment of its War Crimes Unit, comprising State and other IC officers to oversee information-sharing with the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal looking into war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.

Gati was succeeded in 1997 by Phyllis E. Oakley, a career Foreign Service officer and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of INR. Immediately before rejoining the Bureau as its 17th chief, Oakley had served as Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees, and Migration.

Mark Stout and Dorothy Avery worked for INR.

Unclassified

